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Key Points 
The results of the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) stress test, administered to banks 
across the EU and published at the end of July 2016, revealed some large differences across 
banks. Our analysis of the results for the 51 banking groups suggests that not economic 
growth but rather the exposures to non-performing loans (NPLs) and to governments and 
corporates seem to be the main drivers behind the impact of the adverse scenario. This 
implies that the stress tests are primarily responding to the risks that have already 
materialised. They are therefore useful for understanding the implications of the currently 
identified risks, but they do not necessarily give insights into the fundamental soundness 
of the European banking sector. 
Policy Recommendation 
If well-executed, the stress test can be a useful tool for acquiring a better understanding of 
the implications of the current issues facing European banks. It does not, however, give 
insights into the fundamental soundness of the European banking sector, which is widely 
considered to be one of the main objectives of the stress test. To obtain such insights, a more 
intriguing exercise with a longer horizon (say, five or ten years instead of three) and 
multiple scenarios would be recommended.  
  
                                                     
* Willem Pieter De Groen is a Research Fellow at CEPS in Brussels and an Associate Researcher at the 
International Research Centre on Cooperative Finance (IRCCF) of HEC Montréal. 
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The results of the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) latest bi-annual stress test revealed some large 
differences across banks. In this policy brief we analyse the results for the 51 European banking groups, 
with a focus on better understanding the main drivers behind the results of the test that assumed 
demand and financial shocks. The main findings are that not economic growth but rather the exposures 
to non-performing loans (NPLs) and to governments and corporates seem to be the main drivers behind 
the impact of the pessimistic (adverse) scenario. This implies that the stress tests are primarily 
responding to the risks that have already materialised and not necessarily provide insights into the 
fundamental soundness of the European banking sector. 
Large differences across banks 
Looking at the impact of the stress tests conducted by the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
the banks would lose 3.4%1 of the fully-loaded common equity tier 1 (CET1) in the three-year 
period under the scenario. The differences are, however, large. The stress would have the 
largest impact on the Italian Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS). Hence, the bank would 
lose 14.5% of its CET1, which is equivalent to more than three times the minimum requirement 
of 4.5% CET1. This poor performance was already expected given the sizeable exposures to 
non-performing loans (NPLs) in the bank’s portfolio.2 In turn, the adverse economic scenario 
would barely have an impact on the only Norwegian bank in the sample, DNB, which would 
lose less than 0.1% of its CET1. 
The impact of the adverse scenario is also expressed in terms of leverage exposure, which is 
likely to be binding only in 2018. The regression analysis in Annex 1 confirms that the change 
in leverage exposure is almost completely explained by the impact of the adverse scenario on 
CET1 ratio (+), risk-weighted assets to leverage ratio (+), and change in risk-exposures (-). In 
the remainder of this analysis of the impact of the adverse scenario, we therefore focus 
exclusively on the impact expressed in fully-loaded CET1 ratio. 
Adverse scenario 
To fully understand the results one needs to take a closer look at the adverse scenario and the 
different channels (‘exposures’) through which this scenario impacts the profit and loss 
accounts, and thus ultimately capital. 
The adverse scenario foresees a demand shock (foreign and domestic) as well as financial 
shock in the period between 2016 and 2018. The adverse scenario also includes a set of shocks 
to residential and commercial real estate prices, as well to foreign exchange rates in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The shocks are estimated to lead to an average cumulative drop in real 
GDP of 7.1% from the baseline. More specifically, the shocks vary between countries from 
4.8% in Hungary to 14.8% in Latvia. The difference between the five largest EU countries, 
however, are fairly limited in both real and nominal terms. The difference between France 
(5.6%), Germany (6.6%), Italy (5.9%), Spain (6.7%) and the United Kingdom (6.8%) is just over 
one percent when considering the deviation between the baseline and adverse scenario real 
growth rates. The absolute cumulative growth rates are within a 1.5% range. When accounting 
for inflation, the GDP growth rates vary from approximately -14.6% in Greece to 4.4% in 
                                                     
1 The impact of the adverse scenario is 3.4% weighted for risk-weighted assets and 3.9% when the plain 
average is taken. 
2 See also De Groen (2016) for a case study on Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 
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Hungary. The differences between the five larger European countries are substantially 
smaller, with less than 5%. When Germany and the UK are excluded from the sample, the 
difference is even less than 1%. It is worth noting that the nominal growth in Germany is with 
a decline of 3.7%, which is assumed to be substantially lower than that of France (-0.1%), Italy 
(-1.0%) and Spain (-0.4%). The limited variance and the fact that countries that are currently 
struggling more are less affected offer possible reasons why the economic growth has limited 
explanatory power when regressed on the total impact of the adverse scenario. Hence, both 
the real and nominal cumulative growth have a counter-intuitive insignificant positive 
relationship with the impact of the adverse scenario, i.e. the higher economic growth, the 
higher the total impact of the adverse scenario.  
The 2016 stress test is thus a sort of black box in which many different shocks are jumbled 
together, which makes deciphering the results not necessarily straightforward. To enhance 
our understanding, we tried to identify the main drivers behind the total impact of the adverse 
scenario. 
How do the projected losses arise? 
Figure 1 shows the different elements of the impact of the stress tests and their contribution 
to the total impact of the adverse scenario. The EBA assumes that banks make on average 
profits of about 0.9 % of their risk-weighted assets (RWA). Over three years this amounts to a 
cushion worth 2.7% of RWA. Under the adverse scenario this cushion is more than offset by 
losses arising from a number of channel impairments, market risk, risk exposure, dividend 
payments and other effects. The main losses are caused by impairments (3.7%) and market 
risks (0.6%). Moreover, the risk-weights (risk exposure) are increasing under the scenarios, 
which has the effect of reducing the CET1 ratio (1.2%).  
Economic growth has a significant impact on some of the components of the impact of the 
adverse scenario. A decidedly mixed picture arises when looking at the impact of the 
cumulative nominal economic growth on the five key components. The impairments and 
market risks are positively related to the impact of the adverse scenario and the dividends 
and risk exposures negatively so. All the results except for profits are significant at least at the 
10% level. Moreover, the economic growth explains only about a quarter or less of the variance 
in the respective components. 
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Figure 1. Decomposed impact of the adverse scenario (CET1) 
 
Note: The figure shows the decomposed impact of the adverse scenario on both the fully loaded CET1 
(% of total risk-weighted assets). The figures are weighted based on share in risk-weighted assets. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on EBA (2016). 
Government and corporate exposures 
The main drivers behind the stress test results are, however, the exposures to governments 
and corporates as well as non-performing exposures. To identify the main drivers of the stress 
test results, the main exposures have been regressed on the impact of the adverse scenario. 
The combined exposures to governments, institutions, corporates and retail account, on 
average, for more than 80% of the total exposures provided in the results of the stress test.  
They results of the regressions show that the level of the government exposures best explains 
the impact of the adverse scenario among the four variables. Government exposures have a 
significantly (5% level) positive relationship with the impact of the adverse scenario, i.e. banks 
with relatively larger exposures to governments are more affected by the adverse scenario. 
The explanatory power is, with about one-tenth of the variance in the impact of the adverse 
scenario, relatively limited.  
Turning to the results for the different components as shown in Figure 1, the results show that 
there is a significant (5% level) positive relation with market risks. In fact, the higher the 
government exposures, the higher the impact of the market risk. The latter can be explained 
by the stress present in the securities portfolios, in which haircuts and lower yields on 
government bonds are foreseen.  
Moreover, exposures to corporates significantly (10% level) reduce the impact of the adverse 
scenario. Similar regressions for the different components of the stress test show that there is 
only a significant (1% level) negative relationship between exposures to corporates and 
market risks. Hence, the higher the corporate exposure, the lower the impact of the market 
risks. The exposures to institutions and retail have no significant relationship with the total 
impact under the adverse scenario. 
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Figure 2. Impact of total adverse scenario vs government exposures (lhs) and distribution of 
government exposures (rhs) 
 
Note: Government exposures include the total exposures to central, regional and local governments. 
The values below the bars in the histogram (rhs) show the maximum values of each bin, which is the 
minimum value for the next bin. Hence, 25% of the banks had exposures to governments between 150% 
and 200% of the own funds at the end of 2015.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on EBA (2016). 
Most European banks hold large portfolios of government debt. Figure 2 shows that for most 
banks the government debt portfolio is about twice the size of the total own funds. The 
portfolios have often low risk-weights and the diversification is limited. Hence, on average, 
about 60% of the government exposures is to the respective domestic governments. The share 
of exposures to the home government vary between 11% for the UK-based HSBC to almost 
100% for the Italian Banco Popolare.  
The large exposures to governments contribute to the creation of a potential so-called ‘doom 
loop’ between banks and their governments. Hence, the systemic relevant banks might need 
to be bailed-out in case the government fails. Although defaults are rare, the recent past has 
shown that it is not impossible and the potential losses can be substantial. In particular in the 
euro area, where several countries share the same currency and devaluation is does not a real 
option, there is a risk of government debt defaults as the Greek private-sector involvement 
(PSI) showed in 2012. In the case of the Greek PSI, the private sector agreed to take a loss of 
more than 50% on their debt securities. At that time it was based on a ‘voluntary’ agreement 
with creditors, but since 2013, the by-laws of all the euro-area governments include collective-
action clauses which would allow the losses in the future to be imposed on the banks (De 
Groen, 2015; ESRB, 2015; Gros, 2013).  
The government risk in the stress-test was primarily addressed by calculating the impact of a 
reduction in yields and haircuts that are largely similar across countries,3 whereas in 
particular the concentration risk forms a potential threat to the system.  
                                                     
3 For example, the haircuts on AFS/FVO sovereign exposures depend on the type of exposure, country 
and maturity. Looking at the total haircut for the 10-years maturity, the haircuts for the EU countries 
range from 6.1% for the UK to 18.3% of the market value for Greece. Haircuts for the larger countries 
were set at: France (7.9%), Germany (7.2%), Italy (11.7%), Spain (11.3%) and the United Kingdom (6.1%). 
R² = 0.1043
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
To
ta
l i
m
p
ac
t 
ad
ve
rs
e 
sc
en
ar
io
 
(%
C
ET
1
)
Government exposure (% of total exposures)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 (
%
 o
f 
b
an
ks
)
Government exposures (% of own funds)
6 | WILLEM PIETER DE GROEN 
 
Non-performing exposures 
Non-performing exposures seem to be the main driver behind the stress test results. The total 
gross non-performing debt exposures on the balance sheet as a share of total gross debt 
exposures have a significant (1%-level) positive relation with the total impact of the adverse 
scenario, i.e. the higher the non-performing exposure, the higher the expected reduction in 
the CET1 ratio under the adverse scenario. The non-performing exposures explain about one-
fifth of the variance of the adverse scenario.  
Looking at the different components, the non-performing exposures largely explain (70%) the 
higher impairments and to a lesser extent the lower risk-weighted exposures (22%).4 There is 
also a quite strong negative correlation (-53%) between the impairments and risk exposures. 
In fact, when the losses on the non-performing exposures are taken into account, the risk-
weights on these exposures can be reduced. The non-performing exposures also have less, but 
still significant impact on the assumed profitability of the banks. Even though the 
impairments are excluded from the profitability, higher non-performing exposures imply 
significantly (10%-level) lower profits. 
Figure 3. Impact total adverse scenario vs non-performing exposures 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on EBA (2016). 
Customer loans form the largest exposures for most banks, which makes substantial losses on 
these exposures or so-called NPLs constitute an important threat to banking-sector. Based on 
the harmonised definition for NPLs by the European Banking Authority in 2013, Italy, Cyprus, 
Greece, Slovenia, Portugal and Ireland, are among the countries where many banks have 
already been resolved with the highest levels of NPLs in the EU. The variances between the 
countries are due to economic structure and situation, bank lending policies as well as 
effectiveness in nudging payments and dealing with distressed debt, but also more to 
structural differences in legal systems, court procedures and tax regimes (EBA, 2016). The 
NPLs are in particular concentrated in the loan portfolios of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises and to a lesser extent of households. The latter, however, often deliver fewer losses 
for the banks since the collateral and personal liability of households is in general less affected 
by failures than that of SMEs. 
                                                     
4 The results were significant at 1% level for both variables. 
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Exposures combined in single model 
Combined, the results of the models with exposures to governments/corporates and non-
performing exposures explain most of the impact of the adverse scenario. The exposure to 
governments and corporates are quite strongly negatively correlated. In order to avoid 
multicollinearity in each of the regressions, only one of the variables is included. The models 
with both exposures to governments or corporates and non-performing exposures explain 
respectively 27% and 28% of the variance in the total impact of the adverse scenario.  
The impact of the non-performing exposures seem, however, not to be linear (see Figure 3), 
but rather take a U-shape. In particular, in banks with higher non-performing exposures the 
impact of the adverse scenario seems to be higher, whereas for banks with a very low level of 
non-performing exposures, the total impact of the adverse scenario is also higher. Hence, 
banks with slightly higher non-performing exposures have relatively lower adjustments in 
the risk-weights. To capture this observation, a square of the non-performing exposures has 
been included in the model. This makes the coefficient for non-performing exposures turn 
negative and almost doubles the explanatory power of the model, respectively, to 55% for the 
model with government exposures and to 56% for the model with exposures to corporates 
(See Annex 2).5 
Besides these exposures, tests have also been conducted with dummies for size, risk models 
(standard vs IRB), business models, ownership structures and the large countries. The results 
suggest that these indicators have very limited impact with almost all of the dummy variables 
showing insignificant results. The additions had limited impact on the model with 
government exposures, non-performing exposures and the square of the non-performing 
exposures, except for the non-performing exposures that becomes less significant at the 
moment that country dummies for the largest countries are included.  
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
In the previous stress tests and capital exercises, the EBA used a threshold to determine 
whether a bank had to raise capital or not. This time the results of the exercise for the banks 
that account for about 70% of the EU banking sector feed into the Supervisory Review and 
Evaluation Process (SREP), which the direct supervisors of the banks use to determine the 
add-ons to the legislative capital requirements.  
Concluding remarks 
On the basis of our analysis of the results for the 51 banking groups, it seems that not economic 
growth but rather, in particular, the exposures to non-performing loans and to governments 
and corporates seem to be the main drivers behind the impact of the adverse scenario.  
This makes the stress test appear primarily to be designed to respond to the current 
supervisory concerns of large exposures to governments and stocks of NPLs, but not, for 
example, to longer-term issues such as enhanced competition through digitalisation, 
cybercrime, long-term low economic growth, etc. Thus, if well executed, the stress test can 
serve as a useful tool for acquiring a better understanding of the implications of the current 
                                                     
5 All the variables are significant at the 1% level, except for the government exposures, which are 
significant at the 5% level 
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issues. It does not, however, provide insights into the fundamental soundness of the European 
banking sector, which is widely considered to be one of the main objectives of the stress test.  
To obtain better insights on the soundness of the European banking sector, a more intriguing 
exercise with a longer time horizon (e.g. five or ten years instead of three years) and multiple 
scenarios would be recommended. Hence, as the results of the stress test and previous 
analyses have shown, the European banking groups are diverse and respond differently to 
various kinds of risks (Ayadi et al., 2016). Moreover, the assessment of the previous cases of 
bank failures showed that even after three years, many of the resolved banks are still 
experiencing substantial losses (De Groen & Gros, 2015).  
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Annex 1. Explaining the impact of the adverse scenario (% of leverage exposures) 
Most of the attention in the media has focused on the results concerning capital relative to 
risk-weighted assets (CET). But the EBA has also provided the impact expressed in terms of 
the leverage ratio. This ratio is currently only monitored, but is expected to become binding 
in 2018. The threshold is expected to become 3% of own funds, as a share of total exposures. 
Looking at the impact, the leverage ratio would drop, on average, 0.8% in the period from 
2016 to 2018 under the adverse scenario. Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) is also 
the worst performer in terms of the fully-loaded leverage exposures with a loss in capital of 
5.8%, while Sweden’s Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken would be able to improve the leverage 
ratio despite the lower-than-expected economic growth. In total, seven out of the 51 banking 
groups in the exercise would not have sufficient capital to meet the minimum threshold.6 
Table A1. OLS-regression results explaining the impact of the adverse scenario (% of leverage 
exposures) 
 Impact adverse scenario  
(% of leverage exposures) 
 1 
Impact adverse scenario (% of RWA) 
0.402*** 
0.0188 
Risk-weighted assets to total leverage exposures 
0.023*** 
0.004 
Change of risk-weighted assets in adverse scenario (% of RWA) 
-0.366*** 
0.044 
Constant 
-0.009*** 
0.002 
Observations 51 
R-squared 0.924 
Adj. R-squared 0.919 
F statistic 190.37 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on EBA (2016). 
The large difference between the CET1 and leverage ratios is primarily due to the difference 
between the denominators of the ratios, risk-weighted assets and leverage exposure, 
respectively. The risk-weighted assets are on average 36% of the leverage ratio, but vary 
between 9% for the Dutch communal financer Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten and 95% of the 
German car-financer Volkswagen Financial Services.  
The change in leverage exposure is almost completely explained by the impact of the adverse 
scenario on CET1 (+), risk-weighted assets to leverage ratio (+) and the change in risk-
exposures (-). Hence, a simple regression with these three indicators explains 92% of all the 
variance (see Table A1). All the variables are significant at 1% level.  
                                                     
6 The following seven banking groups have a fully-loaded leverage ratio below 3% in the adverse 
scenario: ABN AMRO Group (NL), Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (IT), Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten 
(NL), Bayerische Landesbank (DE), Deutsche Bank (DE), Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (DE) 
and Société Générale (FR).  
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Figure A1. Distribution of the impact of the adverse scenario (CET1 vs leverage) 
 
Note: The figure shows the impact of the adverse scenario on both the fully loaded CET1 (% of risk-
weighted assets) and leverage ratio (% of leverage exposures). 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on EBA (2016). 
 
y = 0.2864x
R² = 0.5268
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%
Fu
lly
-l
o
ad
ed
 le
ve
ra
ge
 r
at
io
Fully-loaded CET1 ratio
THE EBA EU-WIDE STRESS TEST 2016: DECIPHERING THE BLACK BOX | 11 
 
Annex 2. Explaining the impact of the adverse scenario (% of risk-weighted assets) 
Table A1. OLS-regression results explaining the impact of the adverse scenario 
 Impact adverse scenario (% of RWA) 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Exposure to 
governments 
0.085**       0.073** 0.067**   0.041 
-0.035       -0.032 -0.026   0.029 
Exposure to 
institutions 
 0.029           
 -0.039           
Exposure to 
corporates 
  -0.057*       -0.061** -0.058*** -0.042* 
  -0.029       -0.026 -0.02 0.023 
Exposure to 
retail 
   -0.03         
   -0.021         
Nominal GDP 
growth 
    0.073        
    -0.098        
Nominal GDP 
growth 
     0.118       
     -0.167       
Non-
performing 
exposures 
      0.175*** 0.163*** -0.380*** 0.179*** -0.370*** -0.372*** 
      -0.051 -0.049 -0.107 -0.049 -0.106 0.105 
Non-perf. exp. 
squared 
        2.392***  2.413*** 2.391*** 
        -0.44  -0.434 0.430 
Constant 
0.028*** 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.062*** 0.052*** 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.01 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 0.010 
Observations 51 51 51 51 50 50 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.104 0.0113 0.073 0.0377 0.0115 0.01 0.194 0.271 0.552 0.277 0.564 0.582 
Adj. R-squared 0.0861 -0.00892 0.0542 0.0181 -0.00913 -0.0103 0.178 0.241 0.524 0.247 0.536 0.546 
F statistic 5.708 0.558 3.865 1.921 0.557 0.5 11.83 8.933 19.340 9.191 20.230 16.010 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on EBA (2016). 
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Table A2. OLS-regression results explaining the components of the adverse scenario 
 Profits (% of RWA) 
(excl. impairments and market risks) 
Impairments (% of RWA) Market risks (% of RWA) 
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
Exposure to 
Governments 
0.058    0.001    0.054**    
-0.035    -0.034    -0.022    
Exposure to 
corporates 
 0.001    0.000    -0.047***   
 -0.029    -0.027    -0.018   
Nominal GDP 
Growth 
  -0.058    0.330***    0.114*  
  -0.097    -0.079    -0.061  
Non-performing 
exposures 
   -0.101*    0.301***    0.026 
   -0.052    -0.029    -0.035 
Constant 
-0.036*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.024*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 0.022*** 0.003 0.024*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
-0.005 -0.01 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003 
Observations 51 51 50 51 51 51 50 51 51 51 50 51 
R-squared 0.053 1.78E-05 0.00728 0.0707 0 1.14E-08 0.266 0.695 0.111 0.131 0.0682 0.011 
Adj. R-squared 0.0341 -0.0204 -0.0134 0.0517 -0.0204 -0.0204 0.251 0.688 0.0933 0.113 0.0487 -0.00917 
F statistic 2.764 0.000873 0.352 3.727 0.00153 5.58E-07 17.43 111.4 6.143 7.354 3.511 0.545 
 
 Dividends (% of RWA) Risk exposures (% of RWA) 
 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
Exposure to 
Governments 
-0.027*    0.020    
-0.016    -0.019    
Exposure to 
corporates 
 -0.002    -0.015   
 -0.013    -0.015   
Nominal GDP 
Growth 
  -0.149***    -0.157***  
  -0.039    -0.046  
Non-performing 
exposures 
   -0.032    -0.094*** 
   -0.024    -0.025 
Constant 
0.006** 0.003 -0.001 0.004** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 
-0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 
Observations 51 51 50 51 51 51 50 51 
R-squared 0.0545 0 0.235 0.035 0.022 0.019 0.199 0.217 
Adj. R-squared 0.0352 -0.0201 0.22 0.015 0.00205 -0.00057 0.182 0.201 
F statistic 2.823 0.0172 14.78 1.770 1.103 0.971 11.93 13.62 
Note: Asterisks indicate the significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) respectively. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on EBA (2016). 
